Translation of "avis client " (French → English) :

Question No. 15 Hon. Geoff Regan: With regard to the Standards Council of Canada (SCC): (a) does the SCC consider the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) a commercial entity or a regulatory entity; (b) does the SCC believe that CSA owns any portion of Canadian law; (c) does the SCC believe that the CSA is afforded an exemption, or exemptions, to Canadian law; (d) does the SCC believe that the CSA has the right to restrict public access to Canadian law; (e) what is the average annual value transferred from CSA to provincial governments in payment for those contributions; (f) what percentage of CSA members’ payments for Canadian Electrical Code (CEC) influence are diverted to non-CEC activities; (g) does the SCC believe that the CSA pr ...[+++]actice of trading influence over, or control of, legislative processes in exchange for money or other value consideration is a violation of law; (h) does the SCC believe that the CSA practice of leveraging regulatory authority for commercial advantage is an abuse of regulatory authority; (i) what is the increase in annual revenue experienced by CSA, expressed both in percent and in Canadian dollars, resulting from this decision to tighten the Code development cycle by 25 percent; (j) what is the average annual value of royalty payments made to CSA by each of the government of British Columbia and the government of Ontario in exchange for the right to print the statutes that CSA claims to own and that these jurisdictions have passed into law; (k) does CSA provide access to Canadian law at different costs to different customers according to the values that these customers have at various times paid to CSA; (l) does the SCC assure Parliament that CSA does not leverage any value in any form, including contributions of content and labour, from activities related to the CEC for any of its commercial developments including the CSA Handbook; and (m) does the SCC believe that articles and documentation that are developed as part of a ...

29. Takes the view that there should be clear demarcation between the audit services and non-audit services that an audit firm provides to a customer, with a view to avoiding conflicts of interest as referred to in Article 22(2) of Directive 2006/43/EC and in accordance with codes of auditing practice; points out that this could restrict ‘lowballing’, the practice of offering cut-price auditing with a view to then offsetting the lower price by charging for additional services; takes the view, therefore, that the demarcation must apply to all firms and their clients; calls o ...[+++]n the Commission, with reference to the 2002 Recommendations on Statutory Auditor Independence, to draw up a list of conditions under which such services would be deemed incompatible with audit services; recognises that the provision of non-audit services, where not incompatible with auditor independence, can play an essential role in broadening the skills base of small and medium-sized audit firms, but takes the view that internal and external audit services should not be provided simultaneously;

29. Takes the view that there should be clear demarcation between the audit services and non-audit services that an audit firm provides to a customer, with a view to avoiding conflicts of interest as referred to in Article 22(2) of Directive 2006/43/EC and in accordance with codes of auditing practice; points out that this could restrict ‘lowballing’, the practice of offering cut-price auditing with a view to then offsetting the lower price by charging for additional services; takes the view, therefore, that the demarcation must apply to all firms and their clients; calls o ...[+++]n the Commission, with reference to the 2002 Recommendations on Statutory Auditor Independence, to draw up a list of conditions under which such services would be deemed incompatible with audit services; recognises that the provision of non-audit services, where not incompatible with auditor independence, can play an essential role in broadening the skills base of small and medium-sized audit firms, but takes the view that internal and external audit services should not be provided simultaneously;

12. Considers that the financial disclosure should take into account relevant business and competition issues and should not be too prescriptive; is of the opinion that it should be enough to disclose the overall volumes of lobbying activity and the list of clients without indicating the individual fees or client-by-client proportionate amounts;

11. Considers that, although some form of financial disclosure is necessary and should be clear and non-discriminatory, this should only be part of an overall picture; is of the opinion that other issues apart from financial backing can be equally important, and is therefore convinced that transparency as to the identity of lobbyists and their clients is the most important factor; maintains, however, that the professional regulations applying in Member States, whereby given categories of lobbyists are required to exercise certain du ...[+++]ties of discretion in relation to their customers and clients, have to be observed without fail;

Special attention should be paid to the verification of the customer's address when this is indicated on the identification document (e.g. documents concerning the operation to be sent by registered mail with advice of receipt to the customer's address).