Translation of "Joint operational tactical system " (English → French) :

36. Calls for the strengthening of the democratic control of FRONTEX by Parliament, and calls on FRONTEX to inform Parliament of negotiations to conclude agreements signed with third countries, to present tactical assessments focused on particular border regions, and to publish evaluation reports on joint operations and other coordinated missions, risk analyses, feasibility studies and statistics on migration trends; points out that democratic oversight of FRONTEX's activities would, among other things, enhance its legitimacy; never ...[+++]theless the information published in those reports should not contain confidential data that may affect ongoing operations;

36. Calls for the strengthening of the democratic control of FRONTEX by Parliament, and calls on FRONTEX to inform Parliament of negotiations to conclude agreements signed with third countries, to present tactical assessments focused on particular border regions, and to publish evaluation reports on joint operations and other coordinated missions, risk analyses, feasibility studies and statistics on migration trends; points out that democratic oversight of FRONTEX's activities would, among other things, enhance its legitimacy; never ...[+++]theless the information published in those reports should not contain confidential data that may affect ongoing operations;

35. Calls for the strengthening of the democratic control of FRONTEX by the European Parliament, and calls on the Agency to inform Parliament of negotiations to conclude agreements signed with third countries, to present tactical assessments focused on particular border regions, and to publish evaluation reports on joint operations and other coordinated missions, risk analyses, feasibility studies and statistics on migration trends; points out that democratic oversight of FRONTEX's activities would, among other things, enhance its le ...[+++]gitimacy; nevertheless the information published in those reports should not contain confidential data that may affect ongoing operations;

Q-240 — Mr. Jaffer (Edmonton—Strathcona) — With regard to ports of entry into Canada: (a) what are the standards used by all customs officers across Canada to determine a high-risk traveller or shipment, and what is the standard procedure as to what to do with such a traveller or shipment once it is determined to be high-risk; (b) under what standard procedure are customs officers expected to refer travellers to immigration officers, and is there any standard for immigration officers to notify customs officers as to the results of such referrals; if it is determined that a traveller should be referred to an Immigration officer and there is no immigration officer at that location, what is the standard procedure that a customs officer shoul ...[+++]d follow; (c) why are there no joint Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) evaluations planned to determine the effectiveness of customs officers and immigration officers at the border; (d) is there a standard for the sharing of data and intelligence between customs officers and immigration officers; (e) is there a standard referral procedure by which customs officers can clearly determine by which points should a traveller be referred to immigration officers; (f) is there an agreement between the CCRA and CIC that would provide for periodic evaluations to be performed jointly by CCRA and CIC to determine the effectiveness of their joint operations; (g) what percentage of the time does the Primary Automated Lookout System-Highway equipment correctly read licence plates of vehicles stopped at border crossing booths; (h) what facilities exist for examining commercial shipments at the Ambassador Bridge in Windsor and where are they located in relation to the bridge customs site: (i) what is the standard procedure for ensuring that truck operators told to report to the facility actually arrive there; and (ii) under what circumstances would procedures dictate that a truck be escort ...

(Return tabled) Question No. 240 Mr. Rahim Jaffer: With regard to ports of entry into Canada: (a) what are the standards used by all customs officers across Canada to determine a high-risk traveller or shipment, and what is the standard procedure as to what to do with such a traveller or shipment once it is determined to be high-risk; (b) under what standard procedure are customs officers expected to refer travellers to immigration officers, and is there any standard for immigration officers to notify customs officers as to the results of such referrals; if it is determined that a traveller should be referred to an Immigration officer and there is no immigration officer at that location, what is the standard procedure that a customs offic ...[+++]er should follow; (c) why are there no joint Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) evaluations planned to determine the effectiveness of customs officers and immigration officers at the border; (d) is there a standard for the sharing of data and intelligence between customs officers and immigration officers; (e) is there a standard referral procedure by which customs officers can clearly determine by which points should a traveller be referred to immigration officers; (f) is there an agreement between the CCRA and CIC that would provide for periodic evaluations to be performed jointly by CCRA and CIC to determine the effectiveness of their joint operations; (g) what percentage of the time does the Primary Automated Lookout System-Highway equipment correctly read licence plates of vehicles stopped at border crossing booths; (h) what facilities exist for examining commercial shipments at the Ambassador Bridge in Windsor and where are they located in relation to the bridge customs site: (i) what is the standard procedure for ensuring that truck operators told to report to the facility actually arrive there; and (ii) under what circumstances would procedures dictate that a truck b ...

Building on the previous successes of the joint Afghan National Police, army and ISAF operations, the Joint Task Force conducted successive high-level joint operations, resulting in the disruption of the freedom of movement of the insurgents and a reduction of their command and control of the insurgent leadership, which forced them to revert to small group and IED tactics.