Traduction de «digital data processor » (Anglais → Français) :

digital soundfield processor [ DSP | digital sound field processor ]

digital light processing | digital light processor technology | DLP technology | DLP [Abbr.]

digital signal processor | DSP [Abbr.]

Digital Light Processor technology [ DLP technology | DLP ]

digital signal processor | DSP | DSP chip

Digital Sound Processor | DSP

digital optical disk | optical digital data disk | optical digital disk | optical data disk | optical digital disc | numeric optical disk

archive digital data and systems | store digital data and system | store digital data and systems | storing digital data and systems

91. Takes the view that the mass surveillance revelations that have initiated this crisis can be used as an opportunity for Europe to take the initiative and build up, as a strategic priority measure, a strong and autonomous IT key-resource capability; stresses that in order to regain trust, such a European IT capability should be based, as much as possible, on open standards and open-source software and if possible hardware, making the whole supply chain from processor design to application layer transparent and reviewable; points out that in order to regain competitiveness in the strategic sector of IT services, a ...[+++]‘digital new deal’ is needed, with joint and large-scale efforts by EU institutions, Member States, research institutions, industry and civil society; calls on the Commission and the Member States to use public procurement as leverage to support such resource capability in the EU by making EU security and privacy standards a key requirement in the public procurement of IT goods and services; urges the Commission, therefore, to review the current public procurement practices with regard to data processing in order to consider restricting tender procedures to certified companies, and possibly to EU companies, where security or other vital interests are involved;

55. Recalls that while the final responsibility for security measures relating to different payment methods cannot lie with customers, they should be informed about security precautions, and financial institutions should be responsible for fraud costs, unless caused by the customer ‘by acting fraudulently or by failing to fulfil one or more of his obligations under Article 56 of the Payment Service Directive with intent or gross negligence’; considers, therefore, that public information campaigns should be encouraged with a view to increasing public awareness and knowledge of digital security issues in particular; calls on the Commissi ...[+++]on, when developing a strategy and instruments for the integration of payment markets by card, internet and mobile phone, to take into account the standards and recommendations of EDPS regarding transparency, identification of the controller/ processor, proportionality and rights of the data subject; considers it important that all payment frauds in SEPA are reported to a centralised site for monitoring, statistics and evaluation, in order to respond quickly to new security threats, and that the main developments should be made public; asks the Commission to extend the concept of privacy by design beyond authentication mechanisms and security safeguards so as to ensure data minimisation, to implement privacy by default settings, to limit the access to individual's information to what is strictly needed to provide the service,- and to implement tools enabling users to better protect their personal data;

55. Recalls that while the final responsibility for security measures relating to different payment methods cannot lie with customers, they should be informed about security precautions, and financial institutions should be responsible for fraud costs, unless caused by the customer ‘by acting fraudulently or by failing to fulfil one or more of his obligations under Article 56 of the Payment Service Directive with intent or gross negligence’; considers, therefore, that public information campaigns should be encouraged with a view to increasing public awareness and knowledge of digital security issues in particular; calls on the Commissi ...[+++]on, when developing a strategy and instruments for the integration of payment markets by card, internet and mobile phone, to take into account the standards and recommendations of EDPS regarding transparency, identification of the controller/ processor, proportionality and rights of the data subject; considers it important that all payment frauds in SEPA are reported to a centralised site for monitoring, statistics and evaluation, in order to respond quickly to new security threats, and that the main developments should be made public; asks the Commission to extend the concept of privacy by design beyond authentication mechanisms and security safeguards so as to ensure data minimisation, to implement privacy by default settings, to limit the access to individual's information to what is strictly needed to provide the service,- and to implement tools enabling users to better protect their personal data;

55. Recalls that while the final responsibility for security measures relating to different payment methods cannot lie with customers, they should be informed about security precautions, and financial institutions should be responsible for fraud costs, unless caused by the customer "by acting fraudulently or by failing to fulfil one or more of his obligations under Article 56 of the Payment Service Directive with intent or gross negligence"; considers, therefore, that public information campaigns should be encouraged with a view to increasing public awareness and knowledge of digital security issues in particular; calls on the Commissi ...[+++]on, when developing a strategy and instruments for the integration of payment markets by card, internet and mobile phone, to take into account the standards and recommendations of EDPS regarding transparency, identification of the controller/ processor, proportionality and rights of the data subject; considers it important that all payment frauds in SEPA are reported to a centralised site for monitoring, statistics and evaluation, in order to respond quickly to new security threats, and that the main developments should be made public; asks the Commission to extend the concept of privacy by design beyond authentication mechanisms and security safeguards so as to ensure data minimisation, to implement privacy by default settings, to limit the access to individual's information to what is strictly needed to provide the service,- and to implement tools enabling users to better protect their personal data;