Traduction de «marché de concurrence » (Français → Anglais) :

competitive market [ competitive marketplace ]

DG C | Directorate-General C - Competitiveness, Innovation and Research, Industry and Information Society, Internal Market, Competition and Customs, Transport, Energy | Directorate-General for Competitiveness, Innovation and Research, Industry and the Information Society, the Internal Market, Competition and Customs, Transport and Energy

Subcommittee on Market Economy and Competition

principle of an open market with free competition

introduction of competition

arm's length | at arm's length | on an arm's length basis

restriction on competition [ discriminatory trading practice | distortion of competition | illegal trade practice | unfair competition | unfair trade practice | distortion of competition(GEMET) | discriminatory trade practices(UNBIS) | unfair competition(UNBIS) ]

competitive share

Now, the amendments have made it per se illegal to engage in agreements to fix prices, divide markets between competitors or to restrict output, regardless of the impact on competition in that market.

In digital industries, network effects and lock-in can create entrenched market positions which could be used to shut out competitors or new entrants.

Finally competition authorities have identified a number of instances of anti-competitive behaviour which distorted markets essentially in the form of cartels fixing prices or allocating markets between competitors (about half of all cases) and to a lesser extent in the form of vertical restraints, i.e. arrangements between players at different levels of the production and distribution chain - usually restrictions on the freedom to set prices - and on abuses of dominant positions, such as exclusivity obligations.

If the data clearly suggest that an equally efficient competitor can compete effectively with the pricing conduct of the dominant undertaking, the Commission will, in principle, infer that the dominant undertaking's pricing conduct is not likely to have an adverse impact on effective competition, and thus on consumers, and will therefore be unlikely to intervene. If, on the contrary, the data suggest that the price charged by the dominant undertaking has the potential to foreclose equally efficient competitors, then the Commission will integrate this in the general assessment of anti-competitive foreclosure (see Section B above), taking ...[+++]into account other relevant quantitative and/or qualitative evidence.