Traduction de «dont l’enregistrement était demandé étant » (Français → Anglais) :

10. Where a feed that is required to be registered is to be marketed in more than one physical form, one application for registration of that feed may be made, one registration fee paid and one registration number assigned to it.

10. Where a feed that is required to be registered is to be marketed in more than one physical form, one application for registration of that feed may be made, one registration fee paid and one registration number assigned to it.

The Court stated further, at paragraphs 122 and 118 of the judgments in T-109/08 and T-110/08 respectively, that since the marks for which registration was sought consisted of the presentation of a product, there was no language barrier to their registration and it was, therefore, in principle, in all parts of the Community where the inherent distinctive character was missing that the acquisition of distinctive character through use had to be established in order for those marks to be registered in accordance with Article 7(3) of Regulation No 40/94.

(a) apply for a prospecting permit for a zone, or apply to record a claim, that covers any part of the area that was covered by the claim the recording of which has been cancelled; or

Instead of establishing whether the marks for which registration was sought varied significantly from the norm or customs of the sector, the General Court merely stated in a general manner, at paragraphs 79 and 78 of the judgments in T-109/08 and T-110/08 respectively, that since no bottle had been sold without a label or an equivalent, only that word element could determine the origin of the sparkling wine in question, so that the colour and matting of the glass of the bottle could not ‘function as a trade mark’ for sparkling wine for the relevant public when they were not used in combination with a word element.

By its second plea, Freixenet claims that the Court infringed Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 by holding, in the judgments under appeal, that the Board of Appeal was not required to put forward specific evidence in support of its refusals to register and could merely affirm a supposedly well-known fact in denying the distinctive character of the marks for which registration was sought, when Freixenet had provided specific and substantiated information showing the original character of the marks at the relevant time, so that they varied significantly from the norm or customs of the sector concerned.

Considering that Freixenet could not have been unaware of that idea, the Court held that Freixenet was therefore perfectly able to refute the argument put forward by the examiner and then accepted by the First Board of Appeal to establish the absence of any distinctive character of the marks for which registration was sought; it could thus have argued that it was not the label but the packaging of the sparkling wine which was normally taken into consideration by the consumer concerned in choosing that product.

According to the Court, that assessment was not based on facts collected of its own motion by the Board of Appeal, but was an extension of the arguments raised by the examiner on 19 November 1998, indicating to Freixenet that the mark for which registration was sought took the standard appearance of a bottle of sparkling wine and was accordingly devoid of any distinctive character under Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation.

That being said, the summer career placement program was a program which had funding allocated on a riding basis.

I think the intent always was that section 196.12 was the warrant-issuing authority, but the way the cross-reference was made to section 196.13, which was the tele-warrant, the telephone call or the fax, it caused some people to believe that there was actually a separate warrant being issued.