Translation of "renseignement en l'absence " (French → English) :

These include first, levying little or no income tax; second, refusing to exchange information concerning taxation; third, lack of transparency in their legislation; and fourth, lack of substantial activities.

The first is the lack of perceived fairness due to restrictiveness of definitions and/or the lack of clarity about applicability to mental illness, and the second is administrative issues in relation to mental illness, namely the lack of appropriateness of the form and the need for guidelines and better information.

L. whereas the protection enjoyed by EU citizens depends on the legal situation in the individual Member States, which varies very substantially, and whereas in some cases parliamentary monitoring bodies do not even exist, so that the degree of protection can hardly be said to be adequate; whereas it is in the fundamental interests of European citizens that their national parliaments should have a specific, formally structured monitoring committee responsible for supervising and scrutinising the activities of the intelligence services; whereas even where monitoring bodies do exist, there is a strong temptation for them to concentrate ...[+++]more on the activities of domestic intelligence services, rather than those of foreign intelligence services, since as a rule it is only the former which affect their own citizens; whereas it would be an encouragement for proportionate interference practices, if intelligence services were obliged to notify a citizen whose communications have been intercepted of this fact afterwards, for example five years after the interception took place,

L. whereas the protection enjoyed by EU citizens depends on the legal situation in the individual Member States, which varies very substantially, and whereas in some cases parliamentary monitoring bodies do not even exist, so that the degree of protection can hardly be said to be adequate; whereas it is in the fundamental interests of European citizens that their national parliaments should have a specific, formally structured monitoring committee responsible for supervising and scrutinising the activities of the intelligence services; whereas even where monitoring bodies do exist, there is a strong temptation for them to concentrate m ...[+++]ore on the activities of domestic intelligence services, rather than those of foreign intelligence services, since as a rule it is only the former which affect their own citizens; whereas it would be an encouragement for proportionate interference practices, if intelligence services were obliged to notify a citizen whose communications have been intercepted of this fact afterwards, for instance five years after the interception took place,

" (2) In any proceedings arising from an application made under section 14 or 15, the Court shall take every reasonable precaution, including, when appropriate, receiving representations ex parte and conducting hearings in camera, to avoid the disclosure by the Court or any person of any information or other material that the organization would be authorized to refuse to disclose if it were requested under clause 4.9 of Schedule 1" .

In our communications with CBSA and other agencies, we have flagged concerns touching on the widening scope of sensitive personal information being collected, the expanding uses and sharing of this information with authorities, the need for clear complaint and redress mechanisms and retention periods for sensitive personal information that would have to be justified.